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ABSTRACT 
 
While increasing income inequality in China has been commented on and studied 
extensively, relatively little analysis is available on inequality in other dimensions of 
human development.  Using data from different sources, this paper presents some basic 
facts on the evolution of spatial inequalities in education and healthcare in China over the 
long run.  In the era of economic reforms, as the foundations of education and healthcare 
provision have changed, so has the distribution of illiteracy and infant mortality.  Across 
provinces and within provinces, between rural and urban areas and within rural and urban 
areas, social inequalities have increased substantially since the reforms began.  
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1.  Introduction     
 
Since the start of the reforms in 1978, China has experienced unprecedented 
economic growth, which has led to spectacular reductions in income poverty (World 
Bank, 2000; Fan, Zhang, and Zhang, 2002).  However, this growth has been accompanied 
by dramatic increases in inequality, especially in the 1990's.  While increasing income 
inequality has been commented on and studied extensively (Lyons, 1991; Tsui, 1991; 
Khan et al. 1993; Hussain et al., 1994; Chen and Ravallion, 1996; Aaberge and Li, 1997; 
Kanbur and Zhang, 1999, 2001; Yang, 1999; Démurger et al., 2002), relatively little 
analysis is available on inequality in other dimensions of human development.  For 
example, West and Wong (1995) discuss fiscal decentralization and increasing regional 
disparities in education and health status.  However, their study focuses on only two 
provinces, Shandong and Guangdong. This paper is a contribution to the attempts at 
filling this gap in our knowledge.  Using data from different sources, it presents a picture 
of the long term evolution of spatial inequalities in education and healthcare in China. 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional and historical 
review of social welfare provision in rural areas and cities.  Section 3 describes the spatial 
distribution of education and health development, respectively, using national level data 
that go back to the pre-reform period. Section 4 concludes, and an Appendix provides a 
description of the data used in the analysis.  
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2.  Institutional Changes in Education and Healthcare Provision  
Until the 1980s, China’s distributional policies manifested a strong urban bias 
(Lin, Cai, and Li, 1996).1  The rationing system introduced in the 1950s enabled urban 
residents to have access to food, housing, education, and healthcare at much lower prices. 
Almost all urban residents in the working age group had guaranteed jobs in the state or 
collectively owned firms. Because these jobs were permanent, the so called “iron rice 
bowl”, urban unemployment was virtually nonexistent.  These jobs also provided urban 
residents with many benefits such as free or subsidized education and healthcare. 
Basically, enterprises and government agencies were responsible for providing social 
welfare to urban residents.  
Compared to the level of social expenditure in cities, rural areas received far less. 
Nevertheless, the government adopted an alternative strategy in rural areas to promote 
basic education and healthcare.  For healthcare, the focus was on preventive rather than 
curative healthcare measures.  The communes, production brigades, and production 
teams had authority to mobilize the masses to engage in public health and infrastructure 
works.  With large manpower input, the government could implement various public 
health campaigns, such as fighting against the four pests (rats, flies, mosquitoes, and bed 
bugs), expanding nationwide immunization, and training indigenous rural health workers 
(so called “bare-foot doctors”).  By the late 1970s, “bare-foot doctors” and clinics were 
set up in almost all the villages.  As shown in Table 1, the numbers of hospital beds and 
healthcare personnel per thousand in rural areas rose dramatically from 0.08 and 0.95 to 
1.48 and 1.81 from 1952 to 1980, respectively. In general, these public health measures 
                                                 
1 This bias still exists today, but in different forms (for example, government invests more in urban than in 
rural areas; universities post higher admission scores for rural students; and there are still visible and 
invisible restrictions on migration from rural to urban areas).  
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were rather successful in controlling infectious and parasitic diseases.  Mortality rates 
specific to infectious diseases declined noticeably in the pre-reform period (Yu, 1992).   
Basic education relied largely on the communes.  Agricultural collectivization 
created a large number of “commune schools,” making access to basic education much 
easier.  As shown in Table 1, the student-teacher ratio in primary school declined from 
35.6 in 1952 to 25.7 in 1980 while the ratio in secondary school decreased from 27.4 to 
17.6.  By 1980 the enrollment rate among rural children reached was almost 90 percent 
(Fan, Zhang, and Zhang, 2002).   
Overall, in the planned era, although health care and school conditions for rural 
residents were much worse than their urban cohorts due to an urban-biased policy, basic 
education and preventive healthcare were widely available.  By the late seventies, 
China’s life expectancy and infant mortality rate were much higher than most developing 
countries, even many middle-income countries (World Bank, 2002).  Despite the 
remarkable achievement in social equity, the collective system had well known economic 
drawbacks.  Since the late seventies, China has implemented a series of rural and urban 
reforms to introduce market incentives in order to enhance economic efficiency and 
dynamism.  In addition, the center granted local governments more fiscal responsibility to 
improve their incentives to develop the local economy.  Consequently, the redistributive 
power of central government has declined.  With limited help from the center and tight 
budget constraints, many local governments in poor regions cut spending on social 
development and let individuals share more healthcare and education expenses (West and 
Wong, 1995).  
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In addition to the general fiscal reforms, rural and urban areas have undergone 
their own reforms.  Following the rural economic reform, the communes were dissolved 
and households became the unit of decision-making, reducing the power of villages and 
directly affecting the provisions of education and healthcare.  Not surprisingly, many 
rural health clinics have disappeared since the rural reform in the 1970s.  The number of 
hospital beds per thousand has declined from 1.50 to 1.11 from 1985 to 1998 (Table 1). 
To fill the vacuum, in 1984, the government authorized private medical practices in rural 
areas.  Because private medical practitioners provide their services according to patients’ 
ability to pay, an increasing number of people have to bear the full cost of medical care. 
The share of out-of-pocket expense in medical care for China as a whole increased from 
16% in 1980 to 38% in 1988 to 61% in 2001 (Table 2).  Table 3 shows that in 1998 the 
self-paid share in total health expenses was much greater for rural than for urban areas. 
After the reforms, most rural residents have been left out of healthcare coverage of any 
kind and paying for a health visit has become the norm.  
Although contested elections have been introduced over the past two decades 
partly in attempt to improve the efficiency of public goods provision, the gains are not 
significant for at least two reasons (Zhang et al., 2003).  First, privatization has made 
taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult.  Second, in many villages, the power 
is not shared between the party secretary and the elected village head, limiting the impact 
of elections.  It is likely that the increasing rural income inequality would translate into 
increasing health inequality, as villages do not have much fiscal power to provide public 
goods and service in poor areas under the current fiscal arrangement.  
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In cities, many people’s livelihood is wrapped up with the fate of state-sector 
jobs.  Unlike the simple objective of profit maximization in private enterprises, state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) have to bear multiple responsibilities of efficient production 
and social welfare provision (Bai et al., 2001).  With greater integration of China into the 
world market, it becomes increasingly difficult for SOEs to compete with multinationals 
and private enterprises because of their full range of social obligations.  In the initial 
stage, the government could afford to subsidize the SOEs through low-interest loans.  But 
with the increasing burden of loss, government’s support to SOEs has declined. 
Therefore, since the mid-1990s, the government has carried out ambitious reforms to 
reduce the noneconomic burden of SOEs by allowing bankruptcy and more open 
unemployment.  Since then, many SOEs have laid off workers and cut health and other 
benefits.  To provide new impetus to the SOEs, the government has launched a series of 
urban reforms since the late 1980s.  The central theme is to transfer welfare-provision 
obligations such as healthcare and housing from enterprises to social insurance agencies 
and individuals (China Development Report, 1997).  Although China has made progress 
in reforming the healthcare and pension system, a well-functioning social safety net is 
still far from in place (Liu et al., 2001).  Therefore, the liberalization of the urban welfare 
system may have made some disadvantaged groups more vulnerable to sudden shocks 
such as catastrophic illness.  
Similar to healthcare, both rural and urban residents are increasingly relying on 
themselves to pay for education.  Table 4 lists the sources for education expenditure, 
showing that the out-of-pocket education expenses have increased significantly.  The 
government’s share in total education expenditure declined from 64.6% in 1990, when 
 5
the data were first available, to 53.1% in 1998, while the share of tuitions and incidental 
fees rose from 2.3% to 12.5% in the nine-year period.  With the increasing out-of-pocket 
expenses on education, children in the poor families may have difficulties in finishing the 
basic nine-year schooling, likely leading to more uneven access to education.   
 This completes our discussion of the institutional changes in education and health 
care provision in China since the start of the reform process.  Sen (1992, 2000) expresses 
concerns about the social inequality consequences of these policy changes.  To what 
extent did this happen?  The next section looks at the evolution of inequality in health and 
education indicators, viewing them through the lens of spatial inequality. 
 
3.  Spatial Inequality in Education and Health over the Long Run 
 
We are interested in the evolution of social inequality in China over the long run, 
comparing the planned era with the more recent era of market reforms.  As noted in 
Kanbur and Zhang (2001), although the ideal requirement for this exercise is household 
level survey data stretching back over fifty years, such data is simply not available for 
China.  Analysts focusing on interpersonal inequality as revealed by household survey 
data have had to analyze much shorter periods or with severely restricted regional 
coverage--a few years for a few provinces, and mainly in the recent period.  An 
alternative approach, as in Kanbur and Zhang (2001), is to view inequality through the 
lens of spatial inequality, meaning by this variations across provinces, sub-divided by 
rural and urban areas.  Apart from the fact that such regional inequality is interesting in 
its own right, the advantage of taking this perspective is that data is more readily 
available at the national level for much longer periods.  As shown in Kanbur and Zhang 
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(2001) and in Table 5, regional income inequality calculated at the provincial level with a 
rural-urban divide has increased. The Gini coefficient rose from 29.3 percent in 1978 to 
25.6 percent in 1984 and then to 37.2 percent in 2000.  The question for this paper, 
however, is: what has happened to social inequality?  We look at the spatial inequality of 
education and health outcomes in turn.  
 
3.1 Education Inequality 
Focusing on the years for which census or sample survey data is publicly 
available at the national level, we initially arrive at rural and urban illiteracy rates for the 
years 1964, 1981, 1990 and 1995.2  Using the published data at the county or district 
level,3 we calculate illiteracy rates at the national level as well as their regional 
inequalities for these years.  The upper panel of Table 6 presents the levels of illiteracy 
for overall, rural, and urban China.  Several striking features stand out from the table. 
First, the illiteracy rate has declined steadily over the years, reflecting the success of nine-
year compulsory education and the high primary-school enrollment rate.  Second, there 
exist large rural-urban and gender-gaps. In 1995, the rural illiteracy rate was 78% higher 
than the urban illiteracy rate.  The illiteracy rate among females is more than twice as 
high as the male illiteracy rate, suggesting a strong gender bias against girls.  Moreover, it 
appears that the gender gap has increased between 1990 and 1995. 
Table 7 further displays the spread in the illiteracy rate across rural and urban 
areas, with the Gini and Generalized Entropy (GE) as inequality measures.  The GE 
                                                 
2 The data in 1964, 1981 and 1990 are from the census, while the information in 1995 is from a one percent 
population survey.   
3 County refers to rural areas while the term of district is used in cities. This forms the basis for our 
rural/urban classification.  
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family of measures is discussed further in Kanbur and Zhang (2001)—the specific 
member of the family used in this paper is the famous Theil measure of inequality. 
Inequality is calculated using the population weighted values of illiteracy for spatial units 
at the highest level of disaggregation for which data is available.  In the top panel of 
Table 7, the first two columns show that the Gini and the GE at the national level 
declined from 1964 to 1981 and then increased from 1981 to 1995.  The same pattern 
holds true for inequalities across rural areas, as shown in the third column for the GE 
measure.  The fourth column shows that across urban areas inequality in illiteracy 
increased from 1964 to 1981, but has stabilized since then. 
As is well known, the GE family of inequality measures can be decomposed into 
the sum of a within and a between group component, for any given partitioning of the 
population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups.  The fifth and sixth columns of 
Table 7 present the evolution of the within and the between group components of 
inequality. Both components rose in the post-reform period.  Using the within-inequality 
and between-inequality, we can calculate the polarization index following the method 
outlined by Zhang and Kanbur (2001).4   As shown in the last column in Table 7, rural 
and urban areas became increasingly polarized from 1981 to 1995. 
The above inequality analysis, based on more disaggregated data, offers a 
snapshot for each of four years.  To check whether the findings are robust over a long 
continuous period, we calculate regional inequality in rural illiteracy rate from 1978 to 
1998, when the data at provincial level are available in various issues of China Rural 
Statistical Yearbook.  Figure 1 graphs the regional Gini coefficients of per capita income 
and illiteracy rate.  As clearly shown in Figure 1, the regional inequality in illiteracy 
                                                 
4 The polarization index is defined as the ratio of between-inequality to within-inequality.  
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across rural areas has increased, consistent with the analysis based on data at the county 
and district level as shown in Table 7.  The rural regional income inequality, measured by 
the Gini coefficient, increased by from 13.7 percent to 24.1 percent in the period of 1978-
1998, but the Gini coefficient of rural illiteracy worsened even more rapidly, from 14.5 
percent to 32.4 percent.  
Figure 2 plots the evolution of regional inequality in the provision of primary and 
secondary education.  We calculate the Gini coefficients of student/teacher ratios in the 
two sectors using provincial data.  The inequalities in the two ratios show a similar 
pattern, except for the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976) when the middle school 
education system was disrupted.  The regional inequality in the provision of public 
education has increased since the late 1970s, reflecting the fiscal decentralization policy 
in the reform period.   
 
3.2 Health Inequality 
 Similar to education inequality, we first look at the health outcomes using more 
disaggregated population census or survey data.  The lower panel in Table 6 reports the 
levels of infant mortality rate (IMR).  For China as a whole, IMR declined dramatically 
from the 1960s to 1980s and then leveled off. IMR in rural areas was significantly higher 
than in cities and the gap widened from 1.5 in 1981 to 2.1 in 1995.  The ratio of female to 
male IMR increased dramatically from 0.9 to 1.3 over the same period, probably an 
outcome of family planning policy, as rural residents in general prefer to have boys.   
 Using the data set, we can further examine the regional distribution of IMR.  As 
shown in the lower panel of Table 7, overall regional inequality increased from 1981 to 
 9
1995, so did the within-rural, within-urban, and between rural-urban inequalities.  It 
seems that the regional variation in health outcome has enlarged over the reform period in 
both rural and urban areas.  
 To understand the driving forces behind the observed changes in health outcome, 
we further investigate the distribution of healthcare provision.  Based on the last four 
columns of Table 1, we graph the urban-rural ratios of healthcare personnel and hospital 
beds per thousand people in Figure 3.  Figure 3 shows that the density of healthcare 
personnel and facilities in cities has been much higher than that in rural areas.  For 
example, in 1980, hospital beds and healthcare personnel per 1000 people in cities were 
4.57 and 7.82, respectively, compared to 1.48 and 1.81 in rural areas.  Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 3, the gap between rural and urban areas has grown.  The enlarging 
difference in access to healthcare appears to be a contributing factor to the widening gap 
in IMR between rural and urban residents. 
 While Figure 3 provides a rural-urban comparison at the national level, Figure 4 
graphs the regional distribution of the above two variables using data at the provincial 
level.  Regional inequality declined steadily in the planned era but leveled off since the 
late 1970s. The picture in Figure 4 is in contrast to the increasing trend of rural-urban 
disparity shown in Figure 3.  This is probably due to the fact that the provincial level data 
used in Figure 4 does not have a rural-urban divide, masking the large variation in this 
dimension within a province.  
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4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have described the institutional and historical background on the 
public provision of education and healthcare and examined the patterns and evolution of 
social inequality.  In the era of market reforms, the old foundations of education and 
healthcare provision have eroded.  First, the increasing fiscal decentralization has reduced 
the central government’s redistributive power.  Second, increasing competition has 
doomed SOEs, as it is difficult to serve well the dual task of profit maximizing and 
welfare provision. As a result, a large number of SOEs have laid off employees and 
reduced welfare benefits.  Third, weak governance at the village level makes it difficult to 
finance pubic infrastructures in rural areas.  Fourth, governments cannot mobilize vast 
manpower in public works as they did in the planned era, because labor must be 
adequately compensated in the market economy.  
With this background, we examine the spatial patterns of social development 
indicators.  Not surprisingly, the changing distribution in outcome of education and 
public health has reflected the evolution of underlying institutions in the process of 
economic transformation.  Social inequalities in both rural and urban areas have 
increased since the economic reforms. In particular, the rural-urban gap is still large and 
increasing. 
It has been argued by many observers that to ensure a long-term sustainable 
development, China should adopt a broad-based development strategy.  A healthy and 
well-educated labor force is a key asset to ensuring China’s success in incorporating the 
challenges of WTO accession.  However, the increasing economic integration will greatly 
intensify market competition, which will likely further weaken the central government’s 
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ability to redistribute wealth among provinces, and it will reduce the role of SOEs as 
social welfare providers.  In addition, the increasing shocks associated with global 
integration may further worsen social inequality and dampen sustainable economic 
growth.  The facts of social inequality presented in this paper call for more attention to 
improving the mechanism of education and healthcare provision and reforming the fiscal 
arrangement between local and central governments so as to ensure more equitable 
education and health outcomes. 
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Data Appendix 
Per capita expenditure, population, hospital beds, healthcare personnel, school 
enrollment, teacher-student ratios, and education expenditures prior to 1999 are from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State 
Statistical Bureau, 2000).  The information on per capita expenditure and population for 
1999 and 2000 are from China Statistical Yearbook (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000 
and 2001).  The healthcare coverage data in 1998 is from China Health Yearbook 1999 
(Ministry of Health, 1999) and the sources of health expenditures are China: Long-Term 
Issues and Options in the Health Transition (World Bank, 1992) and the website of 
Ministry of Health, http://www.moh.gov.cn/statistics/digest03/t28.htm.  
The IMR and illiteracy data are compiled from published provincial and national 
statistical volumes of the population censuses of 1964, 1981 and 1990, and the one-
percent population survey of 1995.  For 1964, we only have IMR for the national level, 
from China: The Health Sector (World Bank, 1984). For 1981, 1990 and 1995, the 
official data report IMR at the provincial level with a rural-urban and gender 
disaggregation for each province.  When calculating regional inequality in illiteracy, we 
use the population weighted IMR for provinces with a rural and urban divide.  Banister 
and Zhang (2002) provides a more detailed discussion on the data issues related to IMR.  
The illiteracy data are available for 1964, 1981, 1990 and 1995, with 
disaggregation down to the “county” and “district” level.  The gender divide is available 
for 1990 and 1995 but not for 1964 and 1981.  The counties correspond to the rural and 
the districts correspond to the urban part of the divided reported at the province level for 
the IMR data.  When calculating regional inequality in illiteracy, we use the population 
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weighted illiteracy rates for counties and districts, without a gender divide.  Since the 
rural-urban divide is only available at the province level for IMR, within rural and within 
urban variations are much more disaggregated for illiteracy than for IMR.  The rural 
illiteracy data at the provincial level annually from 1978-1998 is from China Rural 
Statistical Yearbook (China State Statistical Bureau, various issues). 
 Note that, according to the preface of the 1995 China 1% Population Sampling 
Survey (China State Statistical Bureau, 1997), the definition of rural counties and urban 
districts in the 1995 sampling survey has changed slightly from previous census 
information, so the rural urban divide in 1995 may not be strictly comparable to the 
earlier years. 
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Table 1:  Education and Healthcare in China, 1952-1998 
Year  Primary school
enrollment rate 
(%) 
Primary school graduates 
entering secondary schools 
(%) 
Student/teacher 
ratio in primary 
school 
Student/teacher ratio 
in secondary school
 
Hospital beds 
per 1000 people 
(city) 
Hospital beds 
per 1000 people 
(rural) 
Healthcare personnel 
per 1000 people 
(city) 
Healthcare personnel 
per 1000 people 
(rural) 
1952         49.2 96.0 35.6 27.4 1.46 0.08 2.71 0.95
1957         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
61.7 44.2 34.1 27 2.08 0.14 3.60 1.22
1962 56.1 45.3 27.6 24.8 3.88 0.45 5.07 1.50
1965 84.7 82.5 30.1 21.2 3.78 0.51 5.38 1.46
1970 n.a. 71.2 29.1 22.4 4.03 0.85 4.71 1.22
1975 96.8 90.6 29.0 21.1 4.46 1.23 6.70 1.41
1978 95.5 87.7 28.0 20.5 4.70 1.41 7.50 1.63
1979 93.0 82.8 27.2 19.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1980 93.9 75.9 26.6 18.5 4.57 1.48 7.82 1.81
1981 93.0 68.3 25.7 17.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1982 93.2 66.2 25.4 17.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1983 94.0 67.3 25.0 17.6 4.62 1.47 8.37 1.99
1984 95.3 66.2 25.2 18.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 96.0 68.4 24.9 18.4 4.48 1.50 7.81 2.06
1986 96.4 69.5 24.3 18.4 4.87 1.46 8.36 2.01
1987 97.2 69.1 23.6 17.9 5.22 1.46 8.72 1.97
1988 97.2 70.4 22.8 16.7 5.56 1.41 8.98 1.92
1989 97.4 71.5 22.3 15.8 5.71 1.38 9.08 1.89
1990 97.8 74.6 21.9 15.7 5.81 1.37 9.15 1.89
1991 97.8 75.7 22.0 15.7 5.86 1.36 9.17 1.89
1992 97.2 79.7 22.1 15.9 6.02 1.33 9.34 1.86
1993 97.7 81.8 22.4 15.7 6.06 1.30 9.24 1.83
1994 98.4 86.6 22.9 16.1 6.18 1.22 9.37 1.75
1995 98.5 90.8 23.3 16.7 6.09 1.19 9.31 1.73
1996 98.8 92.6 23.7 17.2 6.08 1.16 9.24 1.71
1997 98.9 93.7 24.2 17.3 6.10 1.14 9.25 1.72
1998 98.9 94.3 24.0 17.6 6.08 1.11 9.16 1.71
Source: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000).  
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Table 2:  Recurrent Health Expenditures by Source of Finance 
Year Per capita expenditure (1980 yuan) Government budget (%) Social expenditure (%) Personal expenditure (%) 
1965  4.7 28   56 16
1970     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
5.1 27 57 15
1975 8.6 28 55 16
1980 10.9 28 56 16
1981 12.1 27 55 18
1982 13.9 26 53 20
1983 15.8 25 51 23
1984 17.3 25 50 25
1985 19.4 23 47 29
1986 22.0 22 45 32
1987 23.4 19 46 35
1988 26.3 18 44 38
1991 37.7 23 38 39
1995 51.7 17 33 50
2000 95.5 15 24 61
2001 101.7 16 23 61
Source: The data from 1965 to 1988 are from China: Long-Term Issues and Options in the Health Transition (World Bank, 1992), Annex Table 9.1. Information 
for later years are from the website of the Ministry of Health, http://www.moh.gov.cn/statistics/digest03/t28.htm. The health expenditure data from 1991 to 2001 
are converted to 1980 yuan using the national consumer price index.  
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 Table 3:  China's Healthcare Coverage in 1998 (Yuan per capita) 
Cities   Countryside Total
Totally public paid 16.0 1.2 5.0 
Labor related  22.9 0.5 6.2 
Semi-labor related 5.8 0.2 1.6 
Insurance    
    
   
  
3.3 1.4 1.9
Cooperative 4.2 6.6 5.9
Self-paid 44.1 87.4 76.4
Other 3.7 2.7 2.9
Source: China Health Yearbook 1999 (Ministry of Health, 1999), p 410.  
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 Table 4:  Sources of Education Expenditure 
Year 
Total education expenditure 
(100 million yuan) Government budget (%) Social expenditure (%) Tuitions and incidentals (%) 
1990     659.4 64.6 33.1 2.3
1991     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
731.5 62.8 34.6 2.5
1992 867.1 62.1 35.0 2.9
1993 1059.9 60.8 36.2 3.0
1994 1488.8 59.4 36.7 4.0
1995 1878.0 54.8 40.9 4.4
1996 2262.3 53.6 41.3 5.1
1997 2531.7 53.6 40.8 5.6
1998 2949.1 53.1 34.4 12.5
Source: Calculated by authors based on Table A-14 in Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 
2000), p 14. 
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Table 5:  Regional Inequality 
Year  Gini
1978  29.3
1979  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
28.6
1980 28.2
1981 27.0
1982 25.6
1983 25.9
1984 25.6
1985 25.8
1986 26.8
1987 27.0
1988 28.2
1989 29.7
1990 30.1
1991 30.3
1992 31.4
1993 32.2
1994 32.6
1995 33.0
1996 33.4
1997 33.9
1998 34.4
1999 36.3
2000 37.2
Note: The figures for Gini coefficients are calculated based on population weighted per  
capita expenditure at the provincial level with a rural-urban divide.  The data sources for  
1978-1998 and 1999-2000 are Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years  
of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000) and China Statistical Yearbook 
 (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000 and 2001), respectively.  See Kanbur and Zhang 
 (2001) for details of the calculation.  
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 Table 6:  The Levels of Illiteracy Rate and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 
Year        National Rural Urban Rural/Urban Female Male Female/Male
Illiteracy rate         
1964        
        
        
        
       
        
       
        
        
50.2 52.5 29.0 1.8
1981 33.9 35.9 20.3 1.8
1990 21.2 23.4 16.7 1.4 29.7 13.3 2.2
1995 17.9 21.8 12.2 1.8 25.5 10.3 2.5
IMR 
1964 180.0
 1981 26.9 37.0 24.8 1.5 25.9 27.9 0.9
1990 29.5 32.2 19.3 1.7 31.8 27.4 1.2
1995 39.2 44.8 21.1 2.1 45.0 33.7 1.3
Note: For data sources, see Data Appendix. 
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Table 7:  Regional Inequality in Illiteracy Rate and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)  
Year  National
Gini 
National 
GE 
Rural GE Urban GE Within 
Rural-
Urban GE 
Between 
Rural-Urban 
GE 
Rural-Urban Polarization (%) 
Illiteracy rate        
1964       
       
       
       
    
       
       
       
29.7 17.5 16.6 11.5 16.3 1.1 6.7 
1981 23.1 8.5 5.9 15.5 6.9 1.6 23.2 
1990 25.1 10.7 9.3 10.9 9.6 1.1 11.5 
1995
 
30.8 17.0
 
14.2 11.1 13.3 3.6
 
27.1 
IMR  
1981 22.4 9.3 12.5 6.5 7.9 1.3 16.5 
1990 29.4 13.9 12.8 8.0 12.1 1.8 14.9 
1995 34.8 19.4 19.4 14.8 15.6 3.8 24.4 
Note: For data sources, see Data Appendix.  The GE measure is parameterized so as to make it the Theil measure of inequality. National inequality in illiteracy is 
calculated using population weighted illiteracy rates at the county and district levels.  Rural inequality covers all the counties while urban inequality covers all the 
districts.  The official data report IMR only at the provincial level with a rural-urban divide but does not report information at the county and district level.  The 
rural-urban distinction at the provincial level for IMR data is consistent with the county-district classification used in the illiteracy data for each of the years 
covered.  Note, however, that the definition of rural counties and urban districts in the 1995 sampling survey has changed slightly from previous census 
information, so the rural urban divide in 1995 may not be strictly comparable to the earlier years. Rural-urban polarization is defined as the ratio of Between 
Rural-Urban GE to Within Rural-Urban GE. For a discussion of polarization measures, see Zhang and Kanbur (2001). 
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Figure 1:  Twenty Years of Rural Inequality in Income and Illiteracy Rate 
 
 
Note: The income inequality measure is the Gini coefficient, calculated by authors based on population 
weighted per capita expenditure at the provincial level in rural areas. The data are from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000). The 
illiteracy inequality measure is also the gini coefficient, calculated from population weighted province level 
data on rural illiteracy rates. The data source is China Rural Statistical Yearbook (China State Statistical 
Bureau, various issues).  
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Figure 2: Regional Inequality in student/teacher ratio 
 
Note: The figure reports regional Gini coefficients of student-teacher ratios in primary and secondary 
schools calculated by authors based on population weighted provincial data from Comprehensive Statistical 
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000). 
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Figure 3:  Urban-Rural ratios in Hospital Beds per Thousand People and Healthcare 
Personnel per Thousand People 
 
Note: The vertical axis measures the urban-rural ratios of hospital beds per thousand people and healthcare 
personnel per thousand people, based on data at the national level reported in the last four columns of Table 
1.  
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Figure 4:  Regional Inequality in Healthcare 
 
 
Note:  The vertical axis represents regional Gini coefficients of healthcare personnel and hospital beds per 
thousand people calculated by authors based on provincial data from Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials on 50 Years of New China (China State Statistical Bureau, 2000). 
 
 
 28
